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Note
A Learning Experience:
Discovering the Balance
Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and
Compelled-Speech Rights at American Universities
Kari Thoe*
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia,' which required the
University of Virginia to provide equal access to activities fees to
all student organizations regardless of their messages.2 The case
stemmed from the University's denial of student activities fees to
any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[fj in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."3 In holding
the denial unconstitutional, the Court spoke in broad terms
about the importance of debate and intellectual exchange at
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1996,
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
2. See id. at 2517-18.
3. Id. at 2515. The University claimed the denial was necessary to avoid
a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See id. at
2520. The Court held that the university's neutral distribution of funds did not
offend the Establishment Clause but that denying funds violated the religious
group's free speech rights. See id. at 2523. This Note addresses Rosenberger
only as it deals with the Free Speech Clause issues. For a more detailed
analysis of the Rosenberger decision in its entirety, see Melissa Manaugh
Feldmeier, Note, Amazing Disgrace: The Sin and Salvation of Rosenberger v.
The University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 293(1996) (explaining Rosenberger analysis and arguing it was improper under
existing Establishment Clause doctrine); Jennifer Lynn Davis, The Serpentine
Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1225 (1996) (detailing
Rosenberger opinions and exposing weaknesses of opinions' Establishment
Clause doctrines); and Ben Brown, Recent Development, A Jeffersonian
Nightmare: The Supreme Court Launches a Confused Attack on the Estab-
lishment Clause-Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257 (1996)(critically analyzing the Rosenberger opinion).
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American universities The Court seemed to take a stand in favor
of protecting fee-funded speech-and particularly controversial
or unpopular speech-at universities.5
At least one scholar, however, has predicted that Rosen-
berger could "sound the 'death knell'" for student fees at Ameri-
can universities.6 These fears were prompted by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's concurring opinion, in which she "note[d] the
possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech
Clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be
compelled to pay for speech with which she disagrees."7 While
the Court specifically reserved this question in Rosenberger,8
Justice O'Connor strongly hinted she would rule in favor of dis-
senting speakers.'
Those fearing the end of student fees had their fears con-
firmed a year later, when a federal district court in Wisconsin
held some uses of mandatory student fees at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison unconstitutional. In Southworth v. Grebe,"
the court held that the university could not use mandatory stu-
dent fees to fund student groups that were predominantly
"political" rather than "educational." 2 The court relied on Ro-
senberger for support of this holding. 3
4. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520 (explaining the important First
Amendment issues at stake in the university environment, "where the State
acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at
the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.... The quality and
creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a vital measure
of a school's influence and attainment.").
5. See id.
6. Davis, supra note 3, at 1254 (arguing the Rosenberger opinion "calls
into question the longevity of student-fee programs at public universities
around the country"). Davis specifically predicted the "death knell" would be
sounded if the analysis suggested by Justice O'Connor's Rosenberger concur-
rence were adopted in mandatory fees cases. See id. at 1256.
7. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2527 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing for support the union-dues
compelled-association cases, see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text).
8. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
9. See id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20980 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
11. No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29,
1996).
12. See id. at *29.
13. See id. at *18 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Rosen-
berger). For further discussion of the Southworth court's treatment of Rosen-
berger, see supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
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Rosenberger and Southworth are only the latest examples in
a long history of uncertainty regarding how universities may use
mandatory student fees. 4 The cases, when examined together,
reveal the tension among the interests implicated by student
fees. 5 While in Rosenberger the Court sought to protect a con-
troversial group's access to a public forum, in Southworth the
controversial groups stood to lose access to the forum in the in-
terest of protecting other students' rights of association.
(Ironically, the plaintiffs in both cases were supported by the
same conservative religious organization. 6) Intertwined in both
cases is the right of the university to create and administer a
public forum it feels is supplemental to the education it is
charged with providing.17
This Note argues that the courts must carefully consider
each of these interests in determining the future of mandatory
student fees at American public universities. Part I describes
the structure of the mandatory fees systems and traces the his-
tory of legal challenges to the systems. Part H argues that the
courts have improperly balanced the interests implicated by a
mandatory student fee in reaching decisions that deny student
fees to "political or ideological" groups. Drawing on precedent in
the area, Part I suggests a solution that better balances the
three interests involved.
14. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2527 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting split among lower courts
as to whether certain uses of mandatory student fees violate students' free-
dom of association); see also infra, Part I.B.2. (outlining conflicting results in
fees challenges).
15. See John H. Robinson & Catherine Pieronek, The Law of Higher Edu-
cation and the Courts: 1994 in Review, 22 J.C. & U.L. 367, 394 (1996) (noting
universities must strike a "delicate balance between providing funds to ac-
tivities that contribute to the educational mission of the university no matter
how distasteful some students might find such viewpoints, and respecting dis-
senters' rights against compelled speech).
16. See generally Anne-Marie Cusac, Suing for Jesus: A New Legal Team
Wants to Cleanse the Campuses for Christ, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1, 1997, at 30,
30-32 (describing legal agenda of the Alliance Defense Fund, which footed the
bill for both Rosenberger and Southworth).
17. See infra notes 82,234-241 and accompanying text.
18. This Note addresses only public universities, as the state action re-
quired by the First Amendment often is not present in the cases of private
universities. See Christina E. Wells, Comment, Mandatory Student Fees:
First Amendment Concerns and University Discretion, 363 U. CHI. L. REv. 55,
n.3 (1988) (noting distinctions between public and private universities for
purposes of First Amendment analysis).
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I. STUDENT FEES: THE STORY SO FAR
A. MANDATORY STUDENT FEES AS A SUPPLEMENT TO
CLASSROOM EDUCATION
Historically, student activities have played a major role at
American universities. 9 In colonial times, university officials
viewed student activities as a positive supplement to education in
the classroom. 0 Today, officials continue to insist that student
activities are vital to supplementing education at U.S. universi-
ties2' and that mandatory student fees are necessary to support
those activities.'
Universities began collecting student fees at a time when
they were not allowed to charge students tuition but were al-
lowed to collect a fee for "incidental" or building expenses.? By
the 1970s, many universities were using student fees to fund a
variety of student groups and activities including student govern-
ments, publications, concerts, sports, academic clubs, honor so-
cieties, and health services, to name just a few.24 The power of
universities to collect student fees is well-established.? Just
what the fees may be used to fund has been more controversial.26
19. See DAvID L. MEABON ET AL., STUDENT ACTIT=Y FEES: A LEGAL AND
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (1979).
20. See id. at 1-2.
21. See, e.g., Cusac, supra note 16, at 32 (noting that University of Wis-
consin Regents state it is the purpose of a university to promote a forum al-
lowing the free expression of competing viewpoints).
22. Proponents of mandatory student fees claim much of the speech cur-
rently thriving on campus would no longer be able to survive. See id. at 31
(claiming without funding "much student expression will end"); see also Dave
Newbart, College Student Fees Face First Amendment Test, Ci. TRIB., June
4, 1997, § 1, at 1, 17 (reporting proponents argue without fees support, many
groups will "fizzle," with the greatest impact hitting smaller or more contro-
versial groups).
23. See generally MEABON ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-7 (describing early
fees challenges in which courts validated collection of fees).
24. See MEABON ET AL., supra note 19, at 24 (reporting survey indicates
69.6% of universities surveyed used mandatory student fees to fund student
activities). It is unclear how much this has changed since Meabon's survey.
But see Newbart, supra note 22, at 17 ("As it stands, in addition to tuition,
most schools charge students a few hundred dollars each year in mandatory
fees to cover the costs of such services as student health programs, student
unions and campus recreation centers. The fees also go to special-interest
groups such as chess clubs, black student unions, Asian-American associa-
tions and food science clubs."). For a more exhaustive list of groups funded,
see MEABON ET AL., supra note 19, at 23.
25. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 505 (Cal.
1428 [Vol. 82:1425
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B. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO STUDENT FEES
Since the 1970s, challenges to fee distribution have fallen into
two categories: those, such as Rosenberger, brought by student
groups that feel they are unconstitutionally excluded from fees
funding;27 and those, such as Southworth, brought by individual
students who feel they are unconstitutionally compelled through
the fees to fund speech with which they disagree.28
1. Exclusion from Fees Funding as Impermissible Viewpoint
Discrimination in a Limited Public Forum
While the Rosenberger opinion surprised and confused many
scholars with its Establishment Clause doctrine,2 9 its Speech
Clause holdings seemed a natural application of its previous
rulings with regard to universities.30 People do not have a right
to access all government property for expressive purposes, but the
Supreme Court has recognized that once the government holds
its property out for public use, it may not exclude people based on
the message they wish to convey' Within a public forum, the
government may undertake content-based or viewpoint-based
exclusions only where it can show that the exclusion is narrowly
1993) (noting statutory authority of Regents to collect mandatory student ac-
tivities fee).
26. See MEABON ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 (noting increasing concern
over how student fees may be used); see also id. at 6 (noting influx of lawsuits
regarding use of fees starting in the 1970s).
27. See infra Part I.B.I.
28. See infra Part I.B.2.
29. See sources cited supra at note 3.
30. At least the Court made its ruling seem "natural." See Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. at 2517 (reasoning fees are directly analogous to university public
fora in previous cases); id. (appealing to precedent to determine denial of
funds was based upon viewpoint discrimination). The Court actually settled
discussion among the lower courts and academics regarding whether the
Court's public forum analysis could be extended to mandatory fee systems.
Compare Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 509 n. 8 (Cal.
1993) (rejecting public forum analysis in fees case), with Good v. Associated
Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762, 768 (applying forum analysis to
uphold mandatory student fees). The Court also shed some clarity on determining
when there is impermissible viewpoint discrimination. See The Supreme
Court, 1994-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 216 (1995) (noting "lack
of clarity" in prior viewpoint discrimination jurisprudence led lower courts to
adopt narrow definition). For further discussion of these points, see supra
Parts HI.L and 1A.2.
31. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45
(1983) (holding content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on access to a public
forum must withstand strict scrutiny).
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tailored to meet a compelling government interest.32 The Court
also has recognized a limited public forum, where the govern-
ment has opened up its property for certain specified uses, such
as a school board meetings33 or student organization meetings.34
In limited public forums, the courts may allow content-based
discrimination to maintain the boundaries of the forum, but they
still presume that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible.35
The Court recognized in Healy v. James36 that "state colleges
and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the
First Amendment."37 In Healy, the Court held that denying rec-
ognition to a student group based on the group's views was a
violation of the group's First Amendment rights of association.38
In doing so, the Court also recognized that the First Amendment
must be applied in light of the university environment, and it
allowed that the university could establish "reasonable school
rules governing conduct."39
The Court first applied public forum analysis in a student
activities context in Widmar v. Vincent.4 Reasoning that 'the
campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses
many of the characteristics of a public forum,"4' the Court struck
down a university's attempt to deny access to meeting facilities
to a group because of its religious affiliation.42 The university
regulation prohibited use of university facilities "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching. 43 The Court applied
32. See id.
33. See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 197 (1976).
34. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n. 5 (1981).
35. See Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2517 (1995). Commentators have argued that this flexibility allowed
with regard to limited public fora has made them meaningless as a protector
of First Amendment rights. For further discussion of this argument, see su-
pra text accompanying notes 161-168.
36. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
37. Id. at 180. Healy involved a challenge to a university's decision to
deny funds to a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society, based
in part on the university's impression that the group advocated violence and
disruption. See id. at 186.
38. See id. at 187-88 ("The College, acting here as an instrumentality of
the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the
views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.").
39. Id. at 190.
40. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
41. Id. at 267 n.5.
42. Id. at 277.
43. See id. at 272 n.11.
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strict scrutiny to the content-based restriction on access to a
public forum" and reasoned that the university had not shown
that the exclusion was necessary to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.45
Twelve years later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District," the Court found a similar regulation to be
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.47 In Lamb's Chapel, a
church sought use of school facilities to show a film dealing with
family values from a Christian perspective." The school denied
the application, finding that the film was "church related"49 and
therefore in violation of a rule prohibiting the use of school facili-
ties "by any group for religious purposes."" The Supreme Court
struck down the regulation as applied, reasoning that the exclusion
was viewpoint-based because there was no indication that family-
values films from another perspective would have been excluded5
Thus, the Court's application of public forum analysis has
served to protect more controversial or less popular student
44. The Court seemed to imply that the university had created a limited
public forum by allowing use of its facilities for student organization meetings.
See id. at 267 n.5 ("[T]he campus of a public university, at least for its stu-
dents, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum." (emphasis
added)). The Court later confirmed that implication in Perry Education Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (citing Widmar for
its recognition of a limited purpose forum). The Widmar Court did not
speculate as to whether the regulation in question was necessary to preserve
the nature of a limited public forum. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text. Language in Rosenberger suggests the Court may now allow universities
more latitude in using content-based restrictions to preserve the purpose of a
public forum. See infra text accompanying note 166. However, the outcome of
Widmar might not change under the Rosenberger Court's analysis, as exclu-
sion based upon the religious perspective of the organization would be im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination if the meetings regarded subjects otherwise
permissible within the forum. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
45. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77. The Court rejected the state's asserted
compelling interest that the exclusion was necessary to preserve separation of
church and state under the Establishment Clause, reasoning there would be no
Establishment Clause violation in providing equal access to the group. See id. at
271-72. See also Rosenberger's treatment of the Establishment Clause issue, supra
note 3 (finding that a denial of funding violated the religious group's free speech
rights).
46. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
47. See id. at 393-94. The Court found it unnecessary to determine ex-
actly what type of forum was at issue in the case, because viewpoint discrimi-
nation is impermissible even within nonpublic fora. See id. at 391-92, 394.
48. See id. at 387-88.
49. Id. at 389.
50. Id. at 387.
51 See id. at 393-94.
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groups on university campuses. The Rosenberger decision ex-
tended that protection to cases involving mandatory student ac-
tivities fees 2
2. Mandatory Student Fees as Compelled Association
While the First Amendment does not explicitly protect rights
of association,53 the Supreme Court has reasoned that implicit in
the First Amendment are both the right to free association and
the right not to associate. 4 Most compelled-association cases
deal with a person's right not to be forcibly associated with a
message with which he or she disagrees.55 Most recently, in Hur-
ley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton56 the Court found a violation of freedom of association where a
state's public accommodations law forced a group to include a gay,
lesbian, and bisexual contingent in its parade 7 The Court found
that forced inclusion changed the message of the group's parade
and associated the group with a pro-homosexual message."
52. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. At least one lower court
has followed Rosenberger thus far. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor,
110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). In GLBA, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the Rosenberger Court's analysis to the exclusion, by statute, of organi-
zations "that fosterO or promoter] a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy
and sexual misconduct laws ....." Id. at 1545. The court, in striking down the
exclusion, reasoned "Rosenberger is directly on point with regard to both forum
analysis and viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 1550; cf. Gay and Lesbian Stu-
dents Association v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (striking down similar
exclusion initiated by student senate based on viewpoint analysis alone).
53. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977).
54. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
55. In Barnette, the Court struck a school board rule requiring students
to salute the flag. See 319 U.S. at 642. In doing so, the Court reasoned that
saluting the flag "requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his
acceptance of the political ideas" associated with the flag--"adherence to gov-
ernment as presently organized." Id. at 633. To do so was to allow "public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not on his mind." Id. at 634. The
Court again applied the compelled-association doctrine in Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977). In that case, the Court struck down a state law requiring
automobiles to bear license plates with the inscription "Live Free or Die." See
id. at 717. The Court found sufficient infringement of freedom of association
because Maynard was a Jehovah's Witness who was morally opposed to the
message. See id. at 715. The Court additionally found no state interests
"sufficiently compelling" to justify the infringement. See id. at 716-17. Both
cases in broad terms stand for the proposition that "the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment... includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Id. at 714.
56. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
57. See id. at 572-73.
58. See id. The Court noted that the parade's organizers had not tried to
1432 [Vol. 82:1425
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However, simply being forced to facilitate another person's
speech usually is not enough to trigger the association right.9
The Court generally has refused to find a violation of the right
unless a plaintiff can show actual association with the objection-
able message.60 Thus, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
6
'
the Court rejected an argument by owners of a shopping mall
that their rights against compelled association were violated by
a California state constitutional ruling requiring them to allow
demonstrators in the mall.62 The Court found that there was no
compelled-association violation because the mall had opened up
its property to use by the public, because it was unlikely the
demonstrators speech would be associated with the mall owners,
and because the owners easily could disavow the messages they
found objectionable.6 In a similar vein, general tax expenditures
are not subject to challenge under the compelled-association doc-
trine. "
Despite this seemingly well-established doctrine, the Court
has extended the compelled-association rationale to union shop
situations65 where union dues are used to fund ideological or po-
litical speech-even though this situation arguably involves no
exclude any gay person from marching in the parade; rather, they had tried to
prevent a gay message from being supported by the parade. See id. at 572.
59. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,88 (1980).
60. See id. See generally Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service
Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 15-20 (1983) (describing interests protected in early com-
pelled-association cases).
61. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
62. See id. at 88. The California Supreme Court found demonstrators had
a right to distribute information and collect signatures for a petition under
the California Constitution. See id. at 78. The mall owners challenged that
ruling as a violation of their federal constitutional rights. See id. at 79.
63. See id. at 87.
64. The official reason that taxes are not subject to the doctrine has been
that the tax system could not function if any group with ideological objections
were allowed to "opt out." See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61
(1982) (holding Amish must pay Social Security tax even though morally op-
posed to government-fimded retirement). Additionally, the government is
supposed to act upon the will of the majority. See Keller v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990). For a more detailed discussion of the tax ex-
emption from the compelled-association perspective, see Cantor, supra note
60, at 22-25. Cantor argues that the justifications offered for exemption of the
tax system are equally applicable to the union-dues situation. He argues the
more reasonable distinction is that taxes do not force association. See id.
65. Union shops exist where employees are required to pay union dues as
a condition of employment, and in turn, those unions act as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative for all employees. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1532
(6th ed. 1990).
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more association than the demonstrations in Pruneyard. In
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education," the Supreme Court held
that public employees may be required to pay union dues but
may not be compelled to support political activities of the union
that are not germane to collective bargaining.' The Court ac-
cepted the government's interest in avoiding free-rider problems
and promoting labor peace through unions as justification for
mandatory dues but held those dues could be used only for pur-
poses germane to the interests justifying the mandatory dues.61
This has since been termed the "germaneness test."69 Under the
test the Court requires chargeable activities "(1) be germane to
collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the govern-
ments' vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free rid-
ers'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop. 70
In Abood, the Court cited to the earlier compelled-
association cases and commented on the dangers of compelled
association.' However, it offered very little explanation of why
the union dues situation involved compelled-association inter-
ests anymore than did the shopping mall speech in Pruneyard.n
In both situations, dissenters were not actually forcibly associ-
ated with the message.73 And in both cases, the dissenters re-
mained free to broadcast their own messages, including those
disavowing the messages they found offensive.74 Nevertheless,
the Court has continued to embrace the compelled-association
rights of those subject to shop clauses75 and has extended the
66. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
67. See id. at 234; accord Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,
517-18 (1991)
68. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
69. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519.
70. Id.
7L See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 ('[No official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." (quoting
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))).
72. See Cantor, supra note 60, at 14 (describing Court's acceptance of the
extension of compelled-association doctrine to forced monetary contributions).
73. The dissenters in Abood were not members of the union, and thus
would not be associated with the speech of the union. See supra text accom-
panying note 63; Cantor, supra note 60, at 20.
74. Because they were nonmembers, the union exercised no control over
the dissenters speech and could not prevent them from disavowing the union's
messages. See supra text accompanying note 63; Cantor, supra note 60, at 20.
75. FollowingAbood, the Court further addressed the union dues problem
1434 [Vol. 82:1425
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Abood rationale to cover integrated state bar associations, which
require membership-and fees-as a condition of practicing law
in the state.76
Though Abood's broad language seems to prohibit any
forced monetary support of another's speech,"7 the Court recently
refused to extend its protections to California fruit growers who
objected to mandatory contributions to a government-generated
ad campaign for California fruits.78 The Court explained that
Abood "merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not
being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expres-
sive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.' 79 The Court
further defined the protection as extending only to where a per-
son's compelled fees were used to fund "political or ideological"
activities and found that the fees in question did not fall into
that category."
Students challenging mandatory student activities fees have
claimed that their case is analogous to the union cases and argued
that funding certain disagreeable groups is not germane to the
universities' educational goals.81 University officials, on the
other hand, have argued the public forum created by student
fees is germane to an educational philosophy that doesn't end in
the classroom, and thus that any burden on First Amendment
freedoms is justified.82
in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
456 (1984) (upholding use of union dues for conventions, publications, and so-
cial events), Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
310 (1986) (creating a remedy for return of nongermane dues), and Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (upholding the use of union dues for
miscellaneous professional activities but striking down use of fees for lobbying
unrelated to collective bargaining).
76. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1990)
(concluding the integrated bar situation is sufficiently similar to the union-
dues situation and falls under the Abood analysis).
77. The Court spoke in broad terms about the "freedom of an individual to
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas." See Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977).
78. See Glicknan v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139
(1997).
79. Id. (quotingAbood, 431 U.S. at 235).
80. Id. at 2140. The Court found it relevant that the fruit growers
probably did not disagree with the speech, and that supporting advertisements
"encouraging consumers to buy California tree fruit" would not cause a "crisis
of conscience." Id. at 2139-40.
81 See, e.g., Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475,479 (4th Cir. 1983).
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 507 (Cal.
1993) (acknowledging the Regents' argument that educational benefits justify
a burden on the plaintiffs rights).
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a. Rejection of the Compelled-Association Argument
The first suits alleging that the use of mandatory student
fees to support certain student groups constituted compelled as-
sociation in violation of the First Amendment were decided in
Nebraska in 1973.83 Both suits were decided in favor of manda-
tory student-fees fumding.1 While the courts did not explicitly
invoke public forum analysis, they emphasized that the broad
nature of the speech funded by the fees prevented the students
from being compelled to support a particular view.85 The courts
also deferred to the university's decision regarding the educa-
tional value of funding the student groups.86
By 1993, three state courts and four federal courts had up-
held the use of mandatory student fees to support student
groups." The courts increasingly adopted public forum analy-
83. One case was brought in federal court, one in state court. Both cases
involved suits against the University of Nebraska, and both challenged the
use of mandatory student fees to fund the student newspaper, the Association
of Students of the University of Nebraska, and the speakers program at the
university. See Larson v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 204 N.W.2d 568,
569-70 (Neb. 1973); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 150 (D. Neb.
1973) (noting challenging fees funneled into an unallocated fund). The Ne-
braska cases were decided prior to Abood, but the student-plaintiffs in these
cases relied on two Supreme Court union cases that provided much of the
framework for the Abood analysis. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956), and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740(1961), had resolved the union issue in much the same manner as Abood even-
tually would, but under a statutory rather than constitutional framework
See Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 570 (distinguishing Hanson and Street).
84. See Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 571; Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152.
85. See Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 571 ("If such views are expressed only as a
part of the exchange of ideas and there is no limitation or control imposed so
that only one point of view is expressed through the program, there is not
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs."); Veed, 353 F. Supp. at
152 (holding a university may provide a forum for the expression of political
and personal opinions with the financial support of mandatory student fees).
86. See Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 570 (reasoning university officials have a
right to determine what is essential for the "creation of a better educational
environment"); Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152 ("Within wide limitations a state[university] is free to adopt such educational philosophy as it chooses.").
87. See Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 571; Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152; Hays
County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 122 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no First
Amendment violation in a university newspaper supported with mandatory
fees); Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 1001 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding Public
Interest Research Group fimding, but requiring the fee be used to directly
benefit the university); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 1983)(upholding the use of mandatory fees to partially support a student newspaper);
Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762, 769 (Wash.
1975) (holding fees permissible where not used to support a single viewpoint);
Lace v. Univ. of Vt., 303 A.2d 475, 479-480 (Vt. 1973) (challenging fees to
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sis88 and rejected compelled-association allegations, usually by
reasoning that the public forum created by student fees were
justified by educational goals. 9 Although the courts conducted
public forum analysis, they considered only the universities' in-
terest in creating a public forum," not, as in the exclusion cases,
the student groups' interest in participating in the public fo-
rum.' Additionally, it was unclear if each activity had to be a
public forum or if a large forum could justify the activities within
it. 2 The courts balanced the students' First Amendment rights
against the universities "traditional need and desirability" to
supplement classroom education with an "atmosphere of learn-
ing, debate, dissent and controversy," and determined the scale
tipped in the universities' favor as long as the fees were not being
used as a vehicle to forward one particular viewpoint.93
b. Adoption of the Abood Analysis-The PIRG Cases
The first time a court struck down use of a fee on compelled-
association grounds, it was a fee earmarked for just one organi-
speakers bureau, newspaper, certain films, and travel of student government
president to conference). Until 1993, only the Third Circuit had rejected the
any use of a mandatory student fee. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060,
1068 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that mandatory student fees could not be used to
support a Public Interest Research Group); see also infra notes 94-107 and
accompanying text (discussing Galda).
88. See, e.g., Lace, 303 A.2d at 479 (comparing the "monetary platform" of
fees funding with the platform provided by the "speakers corner of Hyde Park
in London"); Hays, 969 F.2d at 123 (finding fees funding provided to support a
campus newspaper "creates a forum for public discussion of University-
related issues").
89. Abood, handed down in 1976, did not change the courts' fees analysis.
Rather, the courts reasoned that even if the Abood test was applicable, the
contested funded activities were "germane" to the universities' educational
missions. See, e.g., Kania, 702 F.2d at 479-480 (distinguishing Abood because
providing public forum is a vital part of university's educational mission and
because a variety of viewpoints are fostered by fees funding); Hayes, 969 F.2d
at 123 (reasoning fees funding meets Abood "germaneness" test).
90. See, e.g., Good, 542 P.2d at 768 (balancing the rights of a university to
create a public forum against the associational rights of dissenting students).
91. While student groups undoubtedly have no right to student activity
fumds, the public forum analysis indicates they have a right to equal access
once a public forum for funding has been allowed. See supra Part I.B.1.
92. See, e.g., Jason F. Lauren, Comment, "Fee Speech": First Amendment
Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 279, 304 (1984)
(arguing early court decisions failed to address whether each activity needed
to be a forum); see also Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500,
509 n.8 (Cal. 1993) (interpreting early fees cases as requiring each individual
activity be a forum).
93. Good, 542 P.2d at 768-69.
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zation. Galda v. Rutgers94 involved a refundable fee granted ex-
clusively to the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group
(NJPIRG).95 The NJPIRG was independent of the university,
participated in legislative matters, and "actively engaged in re-
search lobbying and advocacy for social change." 6 The Galda
court reasoned that since most of the NJPIRG's activities were
political and most took place off-campus, funding the NJPIRG
could not be justified as a supplement to education at the uni-
versity.97 The court rejected public forum analysis because the
NJPIRG was funded through a process separate from other
"student" organizations.98 Thus, the court specifically declined to
approach the question posed by mandatory fees funding a broad
range of activities.9 While the Galda ruling fit in with other
courts' dicta regarding fees used to support one particular view-
point (or set of viewpoints),1°° the case marked the first time a
court refused to defer to the university regarding what was
"educational."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
mandatorily funded PIRGs in Carroll v. Blinken."°I In that case,
the court recognized the New York PIRG as an infringement of
the speech rights of dissenting students, 3 but it held that the
university's interests were "substantial enough" to justify the in-
fringement with regard to speech activities directed at the campus
94. 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985).
95. See id. at 1061-62.
96. Id. at 1061.
97. See id. at 1065-66.
98. See id. at 1064.
99. See id.
100. For an argument that Galda broke with precedent, see Janine G.
Bauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Student Fees for Political Student
Groups in the Campus Public Forum: Galda v. Bloustein and the Right to As-
sociate, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 135 (1983).
10L See Galda, 772 F.2d at 1065 (concluding the educational component of
group did not overcome its political nature). The Galda court began a discus-
sion among courts questioning the primary function of purported educational
groups. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 513 (Cal.
1993) (holding that where a group's educational function has become merely
incidental to its political and ideological activities, mandatory fees can not be
used to support that organization); Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *25-29 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996) (reasoning
that Smith and Galda are persuasive and finding at least four challenged or-ganizations are more political than educational).
102. Caroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. See id. at 998.
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community.' However, the court found that the justified in-
fringement still must be narrowly drawn and reasoned that
some aspects of NYPIRG "stretch the nexus between the ex-
tracted fee and [the university's] educational interests too far,
beyond what is constitutionally permissible.""5 Where political
or ideological speech was directed outside the campus, the Carroll
court held mandatory funding unconstitutional." 6 The court re-
quired NYPIRG to put as much money toward on-campus speech
and activities as it garnered from the mandatory fee.107
c. Rejection of the Public Forum Doctrine
Until 1993, students brought suits challenging the use of
mandatory student fees to fund certain, specific groups.108 In
1993, the California Supreme Court heard a challenge to the entire
system of mandatory student activities fees distribution at UC-
Berkeley." In Smith v. Regents of the University of California,110
104- See id. at 1001. The Carroll court, in applying intermediate scrutiny,
was one of the first courts to explicitly name a standard of review in cases in-
volving compelled-funding challenges. Abood and its progeny, the leading
compelled-funding cases, provide no guidance on this issue. See infra notes
220-222 and accompanying text.
105. See Carroll, 957 F.2d at 1002.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1002.
108. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *24 n.3 (noting
Smith was the first case to challenge the entire mandatory student-fee sys-
tem). The prior suits challenged using student fees to fund newspapers,
speakers' groups, student government associations, and PIRGs. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text (citing prior suits and their targets).
109. See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 503 (Cal.
1993). Specifically, the student-plaintiffs objected to the use of mandatory
fees to fund certain "political" or "ideological" groups, lobbying efforts, and
student government political activities. See id. at 506-07, 514, 517. With re-
gard to the latter two issues, the Court held mandatory fees could not be used to
fund outside lobbying groups and remanded for further consideration the stu-
dent government issue. See id. at 517. Most recently the California Supreme
Court denied review of a lower court ruling allowing mandatory fees to fund
the student government. See Charles Burress, UC Fees Suit Has Stretched
On for 18 Years, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1997, at A22. This analysis limits its
consideration to the funding of student groups that, while they may use stu-
dent fimds to take political or ideological stands purport to speak only for
their members. Student governments that pass resolutions purportedly in the
name of the student body at large pose a special problem for compelled-speech
doctrine. For an argument that mandatory funding of these types of student
governments is unconstitutional, see generally Donna M. Cote, Comment, The
First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of Student Government Political
Resolutions at State Universities, 62 U. Cmi. L. REV. 825 (1995).
110. 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993).
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the court held that the fee system unconstitutionally funded po-
litical and ideological speech."' In doing so, the court rejected
the idea that the fees created a public forum."' Rather, the court
held that the fee system was, in part, unconstitutional compelled
association akin to that of the union-dues cases."3 The court re-
quired UC-Berkeley to set a new fee structure whereby students
would not be required to fund groups whose political component
outweighed their educational value."4
The Smith court additionally found that the remedies con-
stitutionally required by Abood's progeny were required in the
student-fees context as well. Thus, while the university could
continue to fund these groups through student fees, it needed to
offer dissenting students a chance to opt out without having
their fees used, even temporarily, for political or ideological
views to which they were opposed."5 Specifically, the court re-
quired the university to provide students with 'an adequate ex-
planation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportu-
nity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in
dispute while such challenges are pending."' 6
d. The Importance of Rosenberger
Rosenberger, handed down two years after Smith, has two
important implications for compelled-association cases. First,
11L. See id. at 513.
112. See id. at 509 n.8 ("No one argues that any of the student groups in-
volved in the case before us is a public forum."). The Smith court's analysis on
this point arguably was in line with precedent. While previous courts ad-
dressing the fees issue broadly addressed the universities' right to fund public
fora, most of those cases dealt with organizations-newspapers, speakers
groups, and student government associations-hat in and of themselves
could be considered public fora. See supra note 87. Moreover, the PIRG cases
also weakened the broad public fora argument. While the Galda court pro-
fessed not to deal with the issue of mandatory student activity fees, it could
have dealt with the PIRG as part of a broad-based public forum. Instead, the
court focused on the separate funding mechanism. See supra text accompany-
ing note 98. The Carroll court accepted the forum argument, but held the
PIRG fee was not narrowly enough drawn to be completely justified by the
public forum argument. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
113. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 507 (applying Abood's "germaneness" test to
mandatory student fees).
114. See id. at 514. The university was left with the task of determining
which organizations could be funded only by voluntary fees. See id. at 513.
115. See id. at 513-514. (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-17
(1990)).
116. Id. at 514 (quoting Keller, 496 U.S. at 16).
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the decision indicated that student activity fees funds should be
treated as a public forum."7 The court reasoned that fees were a
forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense,""' but that nevertheless "the same principles are applica-
ble."' 9 This is important because the results in Galda and Smith
arguably would have been different under the public forum
analysis.2 0 Second, the Rosenberger decision relied on a broad
definition of viewpoint discrimination. 21 The court held that
banning religious speech was equivalent to banning a religious
viewpoint on subjects that otherwise were permissible within the
forum.'2 This broad conception of viewpoint discrimination calls
into question court-ordered remedies requiring universities to
exclude "political" groups from a public forum.'2
e. After Rosenberger: Southworth v. Grebe
In April 1996, little more than a year after Rosenberger was
handed down, three University of Wisconsin law students ac-
cepted Justice O'Connor's invitation to challenge the mandatory
fees system as a violation of their association rights under the
First Amendment.2 4 The student-plaintiffs challenged the use of
mandatory fees to fund eighteen groups that they alleged used
the funds to pursue political or ideological goals." They claimed
117. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2517; see also Davis, supra note 3, at 1252.
118. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Carolyn Wiggin, Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for
a Public Forum: Mandatory Student Fees to Support Political Speech at Public
Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009 (1994) (arguing the Smith court should have
applied public forum doctrine and upheld mandatory fees fimding); Robert L.
Waring, Comment, Talk Is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public Uni-
versities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 541, 543 (1995).
121. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 (rejecting the argument that exclu-
sion of religious speech is content-based restriction by reasoning that all debate
is not bipolar); see also The Supreme Court, 1994-Leading Cases, supra note 30,
at 214 (explainingRosenbergers broadened definition of viewpoint discrimination).
122. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
123. See Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2031 (arguing that court-ordered ex-
clusion of political groups is impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
125. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20980, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996). Specifically, the students objected to
funding the following groups: WISPIRG, the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Campus Center, the Campus Women's Center, the UW Greens, the Madison
AIDS Support Network, the International Socialist Organization, the Ten
Percent Society, the Progressive Student Network, Amnesty International,
144119981
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that in order to attend UW-Madison, they were compelled to
"subsidize groups that contradict their views opposing abortion,
homosexuality, socialism, extreme environmentalism, etc.""
In Southworth v. Grebe, the court held that mandatory student
activities fees used to fund groups that engage primarily in politi-
cal, rather than educational, activities constituted unconstitu-
tional compelled association. 127 The court found persuasive the
California Supreme Court's analysis of the balancing of interests
and its approach to the remedy.'28 The court explained:
The California Supreme Court determined that the cumulative hold-
ings in Carroll and Galda, in addition to Abood and Keller, stood for
three principles. First, a state university may support student or-
ganizations through mandatory student fees because the use of funds
can be germane to the university's educational mission. Second, at
some point, the educational benefits that the funded student groups
offer become incidental to the group's primary function of advancing
its own political and ideological interests. Third, while the funding of
those student groups may still provide some educational benefits to
students attending the university, the incidental benefit to the stu-
dents' education will not justify the burden on the dissenting stu-
dents' constitutional rights.'"
The court accordingly ordered the university to determine which
student groups were more political than educational and allow
students to opt out of funding those groups. 30
In adopting the Smith's court's reasoning, the Southworth
court twice referred to Rosenberger. The court acknowledged
that the Rosenberger court treated fees as a public forum,3 ' but
the Southworth court rejected application of the public forum
analysis to the case at hand, reasoning that many of the groups
being challenged were "clearly to fund political or ideological ac-
United States Student Association, Community Action on Latin America, La
Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan, the Militant Student Union of the University of
Wisconsin, the Student Labor Action Coalition, Student Solidarity, Students
of National Organization for Women, MADPAC, and Madison Treaty Rights
Support Group. See id.
126. See Cusac, supra note 16, at 30 (quoting the plaintiffs brief).
127. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *25-26 (applying the
analysis from the Smith decision to reach such a result).
128. See id.
129. Id. at *22-23 (citations omitted).
130. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20980, at *25-29 (W.D. Wis. July 24, 1997) (memorandum and order).
13L See Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at *31 (Ihe United States
Supreme Court has found that in some sense student activities fees constitute
a forum for speech or association." (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1995))).
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tivity, not to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas."'
The court's second cite to Rosenberger was in reference to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence indicating that the mandatory student
fee was subject to challenge.'
While the Southworth court declined to determine which of
the University's 140 funded organizations were predominantly
political and should thus be denied funding from mandatory
fees, 34 it did determine that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus
Center, the Ten Percent Society,"3  the UW Greens,'36 and the
International Socialist Society were examples of student organi-
zations that engaging in "primarily political or ideological activ-
ity while being subsidized by the mandatory segregated fee."'37
The court ruled that the University could not constitutionally
fund these groups through a mandatory fee.'
The Smith and Southworth courts both adopted a remedy
whereby groups that were primarily political with only inciden-
tal educational benefits would be excluded from the forum, but
neither court provided a useful definition of what is educational
versus political in a fees-funded forum. 9 Both courts reasoned
132. Id. at *32. While this argument may be legitimate with reference to
previous fees cases, see supra note 112, it is in tension with Rosenberger.
While the Rosenberger case dealt with denial of funding to a newspaper, the
Court explicitly rested its holding on the its determination that the student
activities fees fund-not the newspaper involved-was a limited public forum
for purposes of constitutional analysis. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
134- See Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at *26-27. Like the Smith
court, the Southworth court chose to exercise deference to the university in
determining what was more educational than political. At first, the court did
not even fashion a remedy because the parties had agreed they would create a
remedy among themselves. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at *30.
However, after the Seventh Circuit returned the case for lack of a final order,
the Court fashioned its remedy after Smith, requiring the Regents to deter-
mine what groups were predominantly political in nature. See Southworth,
124 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 1997); No. 92-C-0292-S, at *4 (W.D. Wis. July 24, 1997)
(memorandum and order).
135. The court found that both groups are student organizations which
promote homosexual political activism as well as provide educational services
to 11W-Madison students. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at *27-28.
136. See id The UW Greens is an environmental organization. See id at
*27.
137. See id. at *28-29.
138. See id. at *29. The Court's injunction against the fees has been
stayed while the case in on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. See Southworth v.
Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 1997)
(stipulation and order for stay of injunction).
139. This lack of definitional guidance was one of the main criticisms of the
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this was a task better left to the discretion of the university.'"
However-perhaps in an attempt to provide guidance or to deter
the university from deciding that all the groups it funded were
more educational than political-the Southworth court provided
examples of groups it felt should fail the test.41 While the court
singled out groups engaged in specific off-campus political ac-
tivities, such as lobbying, the court also referred to groups it
felt primarily existed to "advocat[e] a political and ideological
agenda."' Furthermore, sponsoring campus debates, which the
court acknowledged as educational, was not enough to save a
group's funding where the court felt the group's primary purpose
was to promote an ideology." Under both Smith and South-
worth, once a group is determined to be engaged in political or
ideological activity with only "incidental educational benefits," it
is ineligible for any mandatory funds. 45
II. CLASHING FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES
REQUIRE CAREFUL BALANCING
A. THE SOUTHWORTH REMEDY AS IMPERMISSIBLE VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION IN A LIMrTED PUBLIC FORUM
1. Failure to Recognize the Forum
The Southworth" court adopted its reasoning and holdings
from Abood and its progeny. 47 While the mandatory fees situa-
dissenting Justice in Smith. See Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 844 P.2d 500,
518-19 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting). Commentators also have criticized
the Smith holding for its ambiguity. See, e.g., Waring, supra note 120, at 625
(discussing "headaches of determining the political status of each student group").
140. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 514; Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at
*3-4 (W.D. Wis. July 24, 1997) (memorandum and order).
141. See supra text accompanying note 137.
142. As an example, the court cited the UW Greens, a group which had
sought introduction of bills in the Wisconsin Assembly and marched to the
state capitol to demonstrate. See Southworth, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at *27.
143. For instance, "[tihe International Socialist Organization's primary
purpose is to promote socialism on the UW-Madison campus." Id. (emphasis
added).
144. See id.
145. See id. at *35 ("If the student organizations are subsidized at least in
part with portions of the mandatory segregated fee, plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment rights are implicated because they are being compelled to support politi-
cal and ideological activity with which they disagree." (citing Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 n. 35 (1977))).
146. Because the Southworth court adopted the Smith court's remedies,
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tion may be largely analogous to the union dues situation,'48
there is one important distinction that the Southworth court
failed to weigh into its decision. While union and bar dues are
used to fund the voice of one entity-the union or bar association,
respectively-the student fees are used to fund a public forum.49
This is critical because it means that any decision in a compelled-
funding case has implications upon the rights of those who use
the forum.' 0 Unlike the recipients of a union's non-germane
dues,'"' who have no claim to the funds, members of the manda-
tory fees-funded designated public forum have some rights not to
be excluded from funding.'52
While the public forum doctrine was established prior to Ro-
senberger, there was some judicial"3 and academic' 4 debate re-
garding whether it was applicable in the student-fees context.
Some commentators'55 and at least one court'56 have questioned
most of this argument is applicable to that decision as well. The major dis-
tinction between the two cases is that the Southworth court had the benefit of
the Supreme Court's holdings inRosenberger, which frame this argument.
147. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text; see also note 75
(detailing cases upholding and further defining the Abood test).
148. See infra notes 213-219 (discussing the applicability of Abood).
149. See Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475,480 (4th Cir. 1983) ("The manda-
tory fees in Abood, therefore, enhance the power of one, and only one, ideo-
logical group to further its political goals. In contrast, the Daily Tar Heel in-
creases the overall exchange of information, ideas, and opinions on the
campus."); Bauer, supra note 100, at 166 (arguing there is "simply no similar-
ity" between the union and student-fees situations); Wells, supra note 18, at
373-74 (noting the public forum distinction between unions and student-fees).
150. Wells and other commentators have argued Abood is inapplicable or,
alternatively, that Abood's germaneness test can be met by student-fee funds.
These arguments are addressed further at infra notes 209-212 and accompa-
nying text. This Note argues that the public forum distinction is an important
distinction in judging the appropriateness of the remedy adopted by the Smith
and Southworth Courts. See Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2030-37 (arguing
Smith remedy is unconstitutional).
151. For instance, a person involved in litigation who is not a member of
the local union. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991).
152. See supra Part I.B.1.
153. Compare Smith v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500,
509 (1993) (rejecting public forum analysis), with Lace v. Univ. of Vt., 303
A.2d 475, 479 (Vt. 1973) (analogizing campus forum to speakers corner on
Hyde Park).
154. Commentators have argued for years that public forum analysis
should be applied in the context of mandatory student fees. See, e.g., Karen
M. Kramer, Comment, The Free Rider Problem and First Amendment Con-
cerns: A Balance Upset by New Limitations on Mandatory Student Fees, 21
J.C. & U.L. 691, 696-97 (1995); Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2030.
155. See Elizabeth E. Gordon, Comment, University Regulation of Student
Speech: Considering Content-Based Criteria Under Public Forum and Subsidy
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whether subsidy analysis is more appropriate in the student-fees
context because the government is spending money. Generally,
the Court has allowed the government to grant funds in support
of one policy or program while denying funds to another, reasoning
that 'although the government may not place obstacles in the
path of a [person's] exercise of... freedom of [speech], it need not
remove those not of its own creation."15 However, even in its
subsidy cases, the Court has acknowledged that what looks like
a public forum and acts like a public forum should be treated
like a public forum.'58 More importantly, the Supreme Court in
Rosenberger explicitly held that mandatory student-fees funds
are public fora-albeit limited public fora' 59
Limited public fora are unique within public forum doctrine
because of the limitations the government is allowed to place
upon them.6 This power of the government to limit public fora
has led some commentators to conclude the limited public forum
doctrine fails to limit the government's actions in any meaningful
way at all.16" ' However, it is not clear that the Court will allow
Doctrines, 1991 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 393, 405-11 (1991) (examining fees under
forum and subsidy analysis and concluding within fees context, the two are
two means to same end); Wells, supra note 18, at 385-88 (examining fees un-
der subsidy analysis). Even after Rosenberger, some continue to argue sub-
sidy analysis is most appropriate. See Luba L. Shur, Note, Content-Based
Distinctions in a University Funding System and the Irrelevance of the Estab-
lishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1710-11
(1995) (arguing subsidy doctrine appropriate because no government intent
exists to create a public forum).
156. See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Mass.,
868 F.2d 473, 476, 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding grant of funding to legal serv-
ices office was subsidy and that revocation of those funds was not First
Amendment violation).
157. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1983)(quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)). In Regan, the Court up-
held the government's grant of tax exempt status to nonprofit veteran organi-
zations that lobby while denying it to other nonprofit organizations that lobby.
See id.; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding govern-
ment may choose to fund only those family planning clinics that do not coun-
sel on the use of abortion).
158. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 176 (acknowledging that existence of "subsidy in
the form of Government-owned property does not justify the restriction of
speech in areas that have been traditionally open to the public for expressive
activity") (citations omitted); see also Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2030.
159. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2516-17 (1995).
160. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (describing the three types
of fora and the limitations that may be placed on them).
161. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The
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just any content-based restriction to pass scrutiny. Rather, the
restriction must be "to preserve the purposes of [the] limited fo-
rum"'2--a concept that has been given little practical meaning.1 63
With regard to the fees-funded public forum, the purpose of
the forum is, broadly, to promote uninhibited debate. It is hard
to conceive a content-based limitation in line with this purpose
aside from the "students only" restriction already approved by
the Court.1" Additionally, viewpoint discrimination is presumed
unconstitutional within any public forum.1 65 As the Court ex-
plained in Rosenberger:
[Un determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of
the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is
legitimate, we have observed a distinction between, on the one hand,
content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.'"
Thus the limited public forum contains an important con-
straint on the state; it may choose not to offer "universal access"
and then exclude certain groups on the basis of their points of
view. Additionally, the Court will take part in determining just
how limited the limited public forum was intended to be.'17
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UClA L. REV. 1713, 1753 (1987)(arguing that limited public forum doctrine imposes no real protection because
"Perry imposes no first amendment constraints whatever on the governments
ability to build discriminatory criteria into the very definition or purpose of
the limited public forum"); see also Shur, supra note 155, at 1710-11 (arguing
no public forum existed in Rosenberger because university did not intend to
create one). For an interesting restatement of public forum doctrine, see
Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment (1998 unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (asserting public forum analysis matters with regard to non-
viewpoint content distinctions, which are broadly allowed in nonpublic fora,
but subject to strict scrutiny in limited or traditional public fora).
162. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
163. The Court has offered only two examples of the permissible content-
based distinctions to preserve limited public fora: "students-only" rules in
university public fora and school board business only rules for school board
meetings. See supra notes 33-34.
164. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981).
165. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2516-17 (1995). Viewpoint discrimination is presumed unconstitutional
even in a nonpublic forum.
166. 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
167. See Waring, supra note 120, at 559-60. Waring argues that "a general
policy of open access does not vanish when the government adopts a specific
restriction on speech, because the government's intent is indicated by its con-
sistent practice .... " Id. This is arguably the case in Rosenberger, where the
Court could have found exclusion of religion was in line with the purposes of
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The Southworth court not only failed to acknowledge that its
decision could have an impermissible viewpoint-based impact on
the fees-funded public forum but it denied the existence of a
public forum altogether. 68 The court did recognize that Rosen-
berger "found that in some sense student activities fees consti-
tute a forum for speech or association,"'69 but distinguished Rosen-
berger as well as other earlier fees cases as dealing with
"challenges to campus newspapers" and reasoned that "[cllearly,
a newspaper is a forum whereby students may express diverse
viewpoints."70 In essence, the court seemed to suggest that each
group funded must individually be a public forum before the fo-
rum issue could be addressed. While this analysis may have been
acceptable prior to Rosenberger,7' the Rosenberger Court expressly
based its analysis and holdings on the determination that the
fund for student activities fees itself was a limited public forum.
The fact that student fees are used to fund a limited public
forum is not in and of itself dispositive in the compelled-funding
cases, but courts addressing compelled-funding cases in the fees
context must take care not to hand down rulings that will violate
the public forum doctrine. To do so would shift from one viola-
tion of First Amendment rights to another. 73 After Rosenberger,
this arguably is the impact of the Southworth ruling.
2. Rosenberger's Second Lesson: Impermissible Viewpoint
Discrimination Within the Forum
The Southworth court should have acknowledged fees as a
limited public forum and then should have determined if its
application of the Abood remedy would infringe upon the First
the limited public forum, but instead perceived it as an anomalous restriction
in the face of a general policy of universal access.
168. Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at
*31-32 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
169. Id. at *31.
170. Id. at *32.
171. See supra note 112 (discussing judicial differences about whether each
activity needed to be forum).
172. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2517 (1995).
173. This sort of face-off between First Amendment rights is not uncom-
mon, but usually takes place between the two religion clauses or between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. See Farber, supra note
161, at 280-83. The Fourth Circuit Rosenberger opinion reasoned that case
presented a First Amendment trade-off between the Establishment Clause
and the Free Speech Clause. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), rev'd 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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Amendment rights of participants in the forum. While a content-
based restriction to preserve the nature of the forum would be
permissible, a viewpoint-based distinction would not. It is arguable
that the Southworth remedy, under Rosenberger analysis, is an
impermissible viewpoint-based exclusion.
The Supreme Court has categorized speech restrictions
based on whether they are content-neutral or content-based.174
Content-neutral restrictions usually are permissible while con-
tent-based restrictions usually are not.75 The Court has recog-
nized viewpoint-based restrictions as a subcategory of content-
based restriction.76 Viewpoint-based distinctions have been de-
scribed by the Court as an "egregious" form of content-based dis-
crimination where one side of a controversy is censored while the
other is allowed to be spoken. 7   While the distinction seems
simple enough, both the lower courts and commentators have
struggled to apply the distinction. 78
An obvious example of viewpoint discrimination occurs when
the government allows speech in favor of unions and disallows
speech against unions. A more difficult question faces the courts
when the government censors speech on an entire subject matter
and argues that the restriction is content-based rather than
viewpoint-based.'79 This determination seems to depend upon
how broadly the court defines the relevant conversation.80
174. Content-based restrictions regulate speech based upon what the
speaker is saying, whereas content neutral distinctions regulate based on
neutral criteria and have only an incidental impact on speech. See Geoffrey R.
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 81 (1978).
175. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46(1983) (within a public forum, "[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations
are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to ef-
fectuate a compelling state interest"); Stone, supra note 174, at 81-82 (noting
Supreme Court conducted a balancing test to determine reasonableness of content-
neutral restrictions, while sustaining content-based restrictions for full value
speech only in the "most extraordinary circumstances").
176. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (finding viewpoint discrimination where racist fight-
ing words were proscribed, but fighting words advocating equality were not).
177. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
178. See The Supreme Court, 1994-Leading Cases, supra note 30, at 215(asserting lack of clarity surrounding viewpoint definition "often led lower courts
to adopt a narrow definition). Commentators prior to Rosenberger disagreed
whether a ban on political speech within the fees-funded forum would be con-
tent-based or viewpoint-based discrimination. Compare Wiggin, supra note 120,
at 2030-37 (arguing impermissible viewpoint discrimination), with Wells, supra
note 18, at 394-95 (arguing permissible content-based discrimination).
179. This was the case inRosenberger. See 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (acknowledging
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In Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, the Court held imper-
issible as viewpoint discrimination subject-matter restrictions
on religious speech.'' The Court also has found restrictions on
racist speech to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination. In
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul,'82 the Court struck down an ordinance
which proscribed "fighting words' that insult, or provoke vio-
lence 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender" be-
cause the court found that the ordinance, in its practical appli-
cation, censored only one side of a conversation.'83 The Court
reasoned that only those with racist views were censored by the
statute, while those advocating racial equality could "fight
freestyle."' u
However, the court has upheld subject-matter restrictions as
well. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights'85 the Court upheld a
restriction banning political advertisements on city buses.'86 In
doing so, a plurality of the Court reasoned that the buses were
nonpublic fora where content-based discrimination against politi-
cal advertising was permissible. 7 In a second case, Greer v.
Spock, 88 the Court allowed a military base to exclude
"demonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political
university's argument that distinction was drawn on basis of content rather
than viewpoint).
180. This has been the major dispute between majority and dissenting
opinions in several of the viewpoint discrimination cases. Compare Rosen-
berger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (majority reasoning that regulation constitutes
viewpoint discrimination) and R.AV., 505 U.S. at 391 (majority finding of
viewpoint discrimination), with Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2549 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that ban on the "entire subject matter of religi[on]" is
content-based) and R-AV., 505 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (reasoning ordinance which bans all fighting words based on race, etc.,
is content-based); see also Farber, supra note 161, at 30-31 ("Perhaps the only
thing that is truly clear is that the Court has not yet found a satisfactory
definition of viewpoint regulation.").
181. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520; Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
182. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
183. Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 392.
185. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
186. See id. at 303-04.
187. Not unlike a limited public forum, the government is allowed to make
content-based restrictions within a nonpublic forum as long as the restriction
"is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). In Lehman, the Court accepted the city's
purported need to "minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism,
and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience." See 418 U.S. at 304.
188. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
1450 [Vol. 82:1425
A LEARNING EXPERIENCE
speeches and similar activities" while allowing civilian speeches
on subjects such as business management and drug abuse."9
The Court held that this was permissible restriction-again in a
nonpublic forum-on the basis of political content, rather than
viewpoint-based discrimination.190 Thus, the Court in these
cases viewed the exclusion of political speech as the exclusion of
an entire conversation.
In contrast, the Rosenberger Court found impermissible
viewpoint discrimination where the University of Virginia ex-
cluded a religious group from receiving mandatory fees.19 The
University defined a "religious activity" as one that "primarily
promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity
or an ultimate reality." 92 In Rosenberger, the Court viewed the
ban on religious groups as excluding one side of a single conver-
sation-or more accurately several conversations' 93-and thus
struck down the restriction as impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination. 94
In so ruling, the Court reafrmed a broad definition of
viewpoint discrimination it had begun to develop in earlier
cases. 95 The Court specifically relied on its holding in Lamb's
Chapel'96 that excluding religious groups from access to school
facilities constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 97
189. Id. at 831.
190. See id. at 839-40 (noting regulation was applied even-handedly).
191 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2517-18 (1995).
192. Id. at 2515.
193. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
194- See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517-18 ("The prohibited perspective,
not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to [fund].").
195. See R.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In RA.V., the
Court reasoned that the ordinance was viewpoint-based, rather than content-
based, because it "license[d] one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while re-
quiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." Id. at 392. The
Court so ruled despite the fact that all fighting words based on race, color,
creed or gender were proscribed by the ordinance. The Court reasoned that
"[d]isplays containing some words--odious racial epithets, for example-
would be prohibited to all proponents of all views. But 'fighting words' that do
not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender-aspersions on a
person's mother, for example-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the
placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality,
but could not be used by those speakers' opponents." Id. at 391. See also
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, which is dis-
cussed supra at notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
196. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
197. See id. at 393-94.
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In that case, the Court reasoned that "It]here was no indication
in the record.., that the request to use the school facilities was
'denied for any reason other than the fact that the presentation
would have been from a religious perspective .... It discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for
the presentation of all views about family issues except those
dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint." 98
The Court reasoned in Rosenberger that, as in Lamb's
Chapel, religious groups were excluded from sharing their per-
spective on subjects otherwise permissible within the forum.'"
The Court reasoned that "[t]he prohibited perspective, not the
general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-
party payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise
within the approved category of publications."2 °° While the Court
seemed to leave some room for an argument that a restriction of
religion as a "subject" (rather than a perspective) could survive
viewpoint analysis,01 it is easy to construe any ban on religious
speech as a ban on religious perspectives, and thus impermissible
under Rosenberger. 2
Southworth's exclusion of political speech is analogous to
the religious speech exclusion in Rosenberger. While exclusion of
political speech has survived in other contexts as content-
based, 3 it is difficult to escape application of the Rosenberger
analysis. While the Southworth remedy allows "educational"
views on world events or family planning, it does not allow so-
called "political" views on the same subjects.2°4 Thus, the remedy
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. The student group excluded in Rosenberger was a student publication
called Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2515
(1995). Wide Awake contained articles about homosexuality, Christian mis-
sionary work, eating disorders, music reviews, and interviews with University
professors-all from a Christian perspective. See id.
200. Id. at 2517-18.
201. The Court acknowledged that it was "something of an understatement
to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct
from a comprehensive body of thought." Id. at 2517. But the Court seemed to
emphasize the wording of the exclusion, which was based on the "perspective"
of the message. See id.
202. See Shur, supra note 155, at 1681-82 (arguing the Rosenberger Court
does not explain what religious restriction could pass its test).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 185-190.
204. For instance, while it presumably would allow a film or speaker on
the subject of the American form of government, it does not allow the Inter-
national Socialist Organization to "promote socialism on the UW-Madison
campus." See supra note 143.
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prohibits political viewpoints on subjects "otherwise within the
forum's limitations."I In fact, political speech is uniquely sus-
ceptible to Rosenberges recognition that not all debate is bipolar" 6
because the response to political speech is not always more po-
litical speech. As Justice Adams pointed out in his Galda dis-
sent, "All too often in our society one particular ideology-that of
passivity, acceptance of things as they are, and exhaltation of
commercial values-is simply taken for granted, assumed to be a
nonideology, and allowed to choke out all the rest."0 7 Thus, one
response to a political environmentalist view may be a speaker
that does not think the saving the environment is worth talking
about, but would rather talk about sports or history. Under
Southworth, the speaker effectively favoring the environmental
status quo (by ignoring the issue altogether) would be allowed to
speak, while the speaker in favor of change would not. This is
impermissible viewpoint discrimination under Rosenberger.2 8
Several commentators have argued that a university's in-
terest in creating and maintaining a fees-funded public forum
justifies the infringement on dissenters' compelled-speech
rights.2" As was discussed above, the courts have recognized
universities' educational interests in creating fees-funded public
fora, and once a university has created a public forum, it must
not impermissibly discriminate within that forum.210 However,
none of these commentators persuasively argues why the public
forum matters for purposes determining if there is an infringe-
ment of compelled-speech rights nor adequately explains why,
once there is an infringement, the public forum can justify any
group within it. 211 This may be the center of the tension between
205. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510, 2517 (1995).
206. See id. at 2518 (noting that the exclusion of an entire class of view-
points is no less discriminatory).
207. Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1071 n4 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
208. For an excellent analysis of political exclusion as viewpoint discrimi-
nation, see Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2030-37. See also The Supreme Court,
1994-Leading Cases, supra note 30, 215 (arguing Rosenberger's analysis will
"encompass most bans on religious and political speech"). This article contains an
interesting analysis of bans on speech about sexual orientation as viewpoint-
based. See id. at 214-15.
209. See, e.g., Waring, supra note 120, at 623; Wiggin, supra note 120, at
2010; Wells, supra note 18, at 381-82.
210. See supra Parts I.B.1., H-A (discussing relevant case precedent).
211. As discussed above, the public forum distinction between Abood and
the fees cases is critical in assessing what remedies are permissible. See su-
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the two doctrines: public forum analysis requires that speakers
are guaranteed equal access, but under compelled-speech doctrine,
the equal access requirement just compounds the harm to dissent-
ers' rights by requiring them to fund lots of different viewpoints
with which they disagree." 2 Thus, the Smith and Southworth
courts were correct to look at the compelled-speech implications
of mandatory fees funds outside of the public forum context.
B. PUBLIC FORA ACTIVITIES AS A VIOLATION OF COMPELLED-
SPEECH RIGHTS
While the Abood doctrine has been questioned as an undue
extension of compelled-association rights,21 1 the Supreme Court
has continued to embrace the compelled-funding doctrine an-
nounced in Abood24 and extended to cover integrated state bar
associations.215 The union-dues and bar association-fees situa-
tions are largely analogous to the mandatory student activity
fees situation. In each case, the state has appointed an organi-
zation to provide a special service for a discrete group of peo-
ple.216  In each case, to prevent free riders, the organizations
must charge a fee to those who will benefit from the services. 217
pra Part HA (comparing Abood and the fees cases). However, the forum,
while it may serve as a justification for infringement of compelled-speech
rights, is not determinative of whether rights have been violated. See Lauren,
supra note 92, at 296-97.
212. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 998 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The fact that
appellants' student activity fee will also compel them to speak through a
number of other campus groups in addition to NYPIRG in no way heals the
constitutional infirmity; it simply means that students must fund more than
one unwanted view."); Bauer, supra note 100, at 183 ("If Abood applies to the
university fee setting at all, the dissenting student must have the right not to
associate.., with any political group funded from the student activity fee ....[Tihe fact that all groups exist within the forum does not make forced asso-
ciation any more constitutional.").
213. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 60, at 12 (1983) ("Abood made a quantum
leap by connecting forced fees payments to a service institution with imper-
missible, compelled-ideological association."). Cantor argues that Abood is an
improper extension of the compelled-association doctrine, which was meant to
protect people from having a message attributed to them they did not wish to
convey-a risk that does not exist in the union dues situation. See id.
214. See supra note 75 (listing cases further affirming and definingAbood).
215. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (applying
Abood's germaneness test to the state bar association).
216. The services provided are union negotiation, regulation of the legal
profession, and education of students, respectively. For the Supreme Courts
comparison of union services to bar association services, see Keller, 496 U.S.
at 12.
217. See id. (discussing need to prevent "free riders" in union and bar as-
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Finally, in each case, the government has a sufficient interest in
compelling funding for expenses related to those services to jus-
tify infringement on speech rights.2 8 Thus, it is appropriate for
courts in the student-fees cases to apply the Abood germaneness
test and determine for which funded activities "the incidental
benefit to students' education will not justify the burden on the
dissenting students' constitutional rights. 19
While there has been some confusion over what standard of
review Abood and its progeny require,"0 and while most fees
cases have not addressed the appropriate standard of review,'
the analysis will be similar under either strict or intermediate
scrutiny.2 This is because the university's educational interests
are strong enough to survive either standard of review, and be-
cause both standards require an ends-means fit between the in-
terest and the challenged activity.' The compelling or impor-
tant state interest is analogous to Abood's requirement that
there be a "vital policy interest,"2 4 while the ends-means fit is
carried out through Abood's germaneness requirement0 5
sociation contexts).
218. The government has an interest in promoting labor peace, regulating
the legal profession, and education.
219. Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at
*23 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996) (citing Smith v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Cal, 844 P.2d 500, 511 (Cal. 1993)).
220. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 522-23 (Arabian, J., dissenting) ("Neither Abood
nor Keller addressed directly the constitutional standard to be applied .... ).
But see id. at 507 (citing Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292 (1986) for application of strict scrutiny).
221 See supra note 104 (noting the Carroll court was the first to assign a
standard of review). This was a major point of contention between the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Smith. See generally Waring, supra note 120,
at 606-13.
222. Compare Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 1002 (1992) (striking down
funding for off-campus political activity under intermediate scrutiny test be-
cause it "stretches the nexus between the extracted fee and [the university's]
educational interests too far"), with Smith, 844 P.2d at 511 (applying strict
scrutiny and citing Carroll, inter alia, as support for striking down funding for
activities when "the educational benefits that a group offers become incidental
to the group's primary function of advancing its own political and ideological
interests").
223. Strict scrutiny is said to require that the activity be the least restric-
tive means, while intermediate scrutiny demands narrow tailoring. But even
under intermediate analysis, the challenged activities must be "necessarily or
reasonably incurred." Smith, 844 P.2d at 523 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
224. Lebnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,519 (1991).
225. See id. In Lenhert, the Court also required that the funded activity
not "significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the
allowance of an agency or union shop." Id. This provides further support for
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It was germaneness that the Smith and Southworth courts
struggled to define in the student-fees context. Both courts ac-
knowledged that universities are entitled to a great deal of defer-
ence in their educational decisions, 6 yet that fact needed to be
balanced against the fact that students don't 'shed their consti-
tutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.'" 7 The Abood Court was
concerned with compelled (and unjustified) funding of political or
ideological causes." Accordingly, Abood prohibited such com-
pelled funding except where it was germane to the state's "vital
policy interest." In the fees context that interest is education.
Thus, the distinction the courts drew between educational and
political or ideological activities was a reasonable extension of
Abood. Even at a university and even within a public forum,
some limits need to be drawn. Otherwise, a fees-funded public
forum could extend to all kinds of political activity with very little
nexus to the educational interests of the university. 9
Nevertheless, the remedy imposed by the Smith and South-
worth courts has generated criticism as being ambiguous and
inappropriate to the university environment?0° Additionally, the
courts' application of the distinction has been criticized for its
the argument that student-fee systems must be narrowly tailored to meet the
university's interest.
226. See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 20980, at
*25 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996) (affirming the Smith Court's weighing of the
interests involved); Smith, 844 P.2d at 505.
227. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
228. This fact is reinforced by the Court's recent decision in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997), in which the Court refused to
extend Abood's protections to a fiuit grower who had been compelled to sup-
port state-wide fruit advertising. See id. at 2139-40; see also supra notes 78-
80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Glickman).
229. Most universities do not fund "partisan" organizations, such as the
Young Republicans or College Democrats. See Newbart, supra note 22, at 17
(stating that UW-Madison does not fund these groups); Bauer, supra note 100,
at 135 n.1. However, as the Smith Court pointed out, there is very little dif-
ference between the activities of these groups and some of the student organi-
zations that are funded by the fees. See Smith, 844 P.2d at 513. But see Jus-
tice Adams's Galda dissent, in which he draws a distinction between
"partisan" and "political" speech, concluding that it is permissible to exclude
the Young Democrats and Republicans, while including the PIRG. See Galda
v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1077 n.13 (3d Cir. 1985).
230. See, e.g., Waring, supra note 120, at 625 (highlighting the ambiguity
of the "educational" versus "political" dichotomy in Smith); Smith, 844 P.2d at
518 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (arguing political or ideological speech is "not the
'price' students pay for a university education, it is the very essence of that
education").
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potential to shift the First Amendment infringements to other
students. 1
The Smith court, seeming to acknowledge the difficult line it
had asked the university to draw, allowed that the university
could choose to adopt a voluntary system of funding, "that avoids
the constitutional defects identified." 2 One of the plaintiffs in
the Southworth case has said he hopes that is the ultimate result
of the fees challenges. 3 While elimination of the forum would be
permissible under the limited public forum and compelled-speech
doctrines, a court could not order the elimination of the forum
without infringing on the academic freedom of the university.
C. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT TO CREATE A PUBLIC
FORUM FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES
There is no explicit protection for academic freedom in the
Constitution, but the Supreme Court has held that the freedom is
protected by the First Amendment. 4 While the Court developed
its protection for academic freedom in cases dealing with indi-
vidual faculty membersus it spoke in broad terms about the
freedom of universities to determine how best to educate. For
instance, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents 6 the Court struck
down as vague and overbroad New York laws barring
"subversive" persons from employment as applied to college pro-
fessors.u7 The Court has since recognized academic freedom as
the "right... %o determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study."*'3
231 See Wiggin, supra note 120, at 2030-37; see also supra Part H-A
(critiquing the Southworth decision).
232. Smith, 844 P.2d at 514.
233. See Newbart, supra note 22, at 17 (stating the plaintiffs think the
groups should raise their own funds); Cusac, supra note 16, at 32 (stating the
plaintiffs say there is no justification for university "life support" if groups
cannot support themselves in the marketplace of ideas).
234- See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the
First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 256 (1989). Byrne notes that academic
freedom is linked to the First Amendment explicitly or implicitly in numerousjudicial opinions, but that none of them explains how, why or to what extent
the First Amendment protects academic freedom. See id. at 252-53.
235. See id. at 256-68.
236. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
237. See id.
238. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 277 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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Each of the courts addressing the compelled-speech question
in the student-fees context has recognized that the universities
must be accorded deference to determine what is educational.2 9
The Smith court claimed to accord deference in both weighing
the interests involved and determining a remedy.' It is appro-
priate for courts dealing with mandatory fees cases to recognize
the rights of academic freedom and accord universities an ap-
propriate amount of deference in that regard. Thus, it would be
inappropriate to deny the university the discretion to create a
public forum unless it is the only constitutional solution to the
compelled-speech problem.24' Academic freedom must be viewed
in context with public forum and compelled-speech rights in-
volved.
III. A PROPOSAL TO BETTER BALANCE
THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
A. ACTIVITIES-BASED EXCLUSIONS
Where fundamental rights conflict, there are no absolutes.242
Rather, the courts must balance the rights involved. When they
fail to do so, they risk further constitutional violations as well as
circular litigation. The courts need to develop a solution to the
fees challenges that better balances the rights of all those involved
and gives clear indications to universities about what groups or
activities may permissibly be funded through mandatory fees.
This proposal argues that solution should concentrate on excluding
certain types of activities-such as lobbying and ballot initiatives-
from compelled funding rather than excluding certain groups.
While the Smith and Southworth courts were ambiguous
about how universities should apply their commands that only
primarily educational groups be funded through mandatory stu-
239. See, e.g., Larson v. Board of Regents, 204 N.W.2d 568, 570 (1973).
240. See Smith v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 505,
513-14 (Cal. 1993).
241 See Wells, supra note 18, at 369-70 (arguing that elimination of man-
datory funding for political groups does not fully recognize the university's
interests). This is not to argue the university could use its academic freedom
to exempt itself from laws otherwise applicable to it, e.g., a desegregation order or
an aff ative action ban. Rather, this Note argues that courts should seek
solutions to constitutional problems that accord the greatest amount of defer-
ence to the universities.
242. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1077 (3d Cir. 1985) ("As is so of-
ten the case in the First Amendment field, we are confronted with competing
interests, not absolute rights.").
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dent fees, the courts seemed concerned with both political ac-
tivities and advocacy in general 3 Because the decisions are
vague and seem to ban funding any group that acts as a political
advocate, the courts' remedy encourages viewpoint discrimina-
tion within a limited public forum.2"
A better-balanced remedy would concentrate on excluding
political speech activities not germane to the university's educa-
tional interests. An activities-based remedy likely would exclude
political or ideological activities that are directed outside the
university, such as lobbying, proposing legislation, or letter-
writing campaigns to legislators. This approach would ensure
that all voices are allowed to participate in the fees-funded forum
and at the same time protect dissenters from being compelled to
pay for speech not justified by the educational interests. Finally,
it would preserve for the university the academic freedom to create
a public forum to foster debate 5
The activities-based exclusion could survive forum scrutiny
because it does not exclude perspectives in conversations other-
wise permissible in the forum.2 Rather, the exclusion is a
permissible content-based exclusion intended to limit the nature
of a limited public forum. The University of Virginia fees policy
contained a similar regulation-excluding electioneering and
lobbying-at the time of Rosenberger, which the Supreme Court
seemed to believe was distinguishable from the religious speech
exclusion because the former was not directed at suppressing
particular viewpoints. 47 Additionally, political speech exclusions
243. See supra text accompanying notes 139-145 (describing the groups
that the Smith and Southworth courts held should be excluded from the fo-
rum).
244 See supra Part IIA (critiquing the Southworth approach).
245. This activity-based proposal draws heavily from the Carroll majority
and the Smith dissent. See Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 1002 (2d Cir.
1992) (allowing funding for activities directed toward campus but not for those
directed off-campus); Smith, 844 P.2d at 527-28 (Arabian, J., dissenting)
(arguing the forum should be allowed, but should not include funding for po-
litical candidates, ballot initiatives, or off-campus speech activities).
246. While it is possible to argue under Rosenberger that some people
might respond to an on-campus film or speaker by lobbying the state govern-
ment, the prohibition on certain political types of speech is less likely to skew
the debate than the prohibition of all political or ideological speech. It is
skewing debate within the forum that the public forum doctrine is intended to
prevent.
247. The Court distinguished the "political activities" because it was, by
university policy, 'not intended to preclude funding of any otherwise eligible
student organization which espouses particular positions or ideological view-
points, including those that may be unpopular or are not generally accepted.'"
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that have been upheld in other contexts have concentrated on
activities rather than viewpoints. 8 Even if the activities-based
restriction were subjected to strict scrutiny accorded those con-
tent-based restrictions not intended to limit the forum, it should
be upheld as the appropriate balance between public forum and
compelled-speech rights.
The activities-based exclusion also appropriately recognizes
compelled-speech rights. Abood requires not that there be no in-
fringement on compelled-speech rights,249 but rather that any in-
fringement on these rights be germane to a "vital policy interest."
Under the activity-based exclusion, dissenters are required to
fund only that speech necessary to the government's interest.
While the university's interest in creating a public forum is rec-
ognized and sufficiently important, its means still must be nar-
rowly tailored to meet that interest. Preserving uncensored dis-
cussion and debate-even political or ideological debate-within
the university forum is narrowly tailored to meet this interest.
Supporting political or ideological activities outside of the forum
is not so closely tailored. There are alternative ways for students to
become involved in lobbying and political campaigns," but there
is no other way for the university to ensure that students are ex-
posed to a campus-wide public forum for discussion and debate.
Finally, the activities-based exclusion leaves the university
more discretion than group-based exclusions to fund those ac-
tivities it feels will best supplement education. Within the activ-
ity restrictions prescribed by the courts, the universities remain
free to recognize whatever groups they feel will best supplement
classroom education. In fact, many universities have similar
limitations already." In sum, the universities would maintain
the flexibility to create a public forum (or not) and to choose
what groups (within the commands of Rosenberger) it is most
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2514-
15 (1995) (quoting University of Virginia's guidelines).
248. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (describing restrictions on
political speech that the court upheld).
249. Lelmert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991). In fact,
Abood and its progeny specifically acknowledge there is some infringement
inherent in serving the state's interest. See id.
250. See Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1985)
(recognizing students could learn the same skills offered by off-campus PIRG
through permissibly fumded on-campus activities).
251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. While many schools en-
force their partisan speech exception only against groups like the Young Re-
publicans and College Democrats, see Newbart, supra note 22, at 17, it would
not be difficult to expand this exception under the activities-based exclusion.
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beneficial to include in that forum. Finally, the university would
not be precluded from giving students exposure to more political
activities through curricular experiences such as seminars, in-
ternships, and independent studies.
B. APPLICATION OF THE ACTIVrTIES-BASED REMEDY
Courts should leave it within the universities' discretion to
apply the activities-based exclusion. Universities need only en-
sure that mandatory student fees not be used for nongermane
political or ideological activities, even temporarily. The univer-
sities could choose to base their funding allocations on the ac-
tivities themselves. Under this method, all activities directed
toward campus could be funded, regardless of in what other ac-
tivities the groups might engage. The universities also could
choose to fund those groups that engage in activities within the
forum and require those groups to keep an accounting demon-
strating that the funds were used only for permissible speech
activities. Finally, the university could require those student
groups wishing to participate in the forum as well as engage in
activities not funded through the forum to create two separate
student organizations, one which would be eligible for funding and
one which would not. All of these methods would satisfyAbood.
While the Southworth court suggested that Abood and its
progeny require that no organization be funded for permissible
activities if it also engages in impermissible activities,. 2 this was
an inaccurate application of Abood's requirements. Rather,
Abood prohibited a situation where all would contribute equally
to the union, and then the dissenters' money would be used to
fund only germane activities, thereby freeing more of the non-
dissenters dues for nongermane activities.23 The Court instead
required that each dues-paying member pay a pro rata share of
the germane costs.? 4
In each of the methods suggested above, the dissenters will
pay only their pro rata share of germane activities within the fo-
rum. Any additional, nongermane activities the groups wish to
engage in must be funded through voluntary funds. Thus,
through any of these applications, the activities-based exclusion
252. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
253. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
254. See id. at 238 n.35.
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will ensure an appropriate balance of the public forum, com-
pelled association, and academic freedom.25
CONCLUSION
Mandatory student fees implicate three distinct First
Amendment interests that, when considered individually, often
will lead courts in conflicting directions. Because fees systems
create limited public fora, student groups have a right not to be
excluded on the basis of their messages. Conversely, dissenting
students have a right against compelled funding of political or
ideological speech with which they disagree. Finally, universi-
ties-under the theories of academic freedom-have rights to
create fees-funded fora to supplement the educational experi-
ences of their students. These conflicting rights must be bal-
anced carefully by the courts in fees cases.
No satisfactory approach to this balancing has emerged
from the courts. Initially, courts recognized public forum rights
of students, discounting or denying the compelled-speech rights.
More recently, courts have recognized compelled-speech rights,
creating remedies that arguably violate public forum rights.
While the public forum and compelled speech issues would be
nonissues if the universities funded no speech, this solution does
not adequately recognize the academic freedom of the universities.
The courts need to acknowledge all three of these interests
and balance them carefully. The best balance can be achieved by
an activities-based exclusion, which would allow all groups to be
eligible for funds, but would exclude certain political activities
from funding. This approach would promote the greatest access
to the forum while excluding from funding those activities most
offensive under the compelled-association doctrine. Finally, it
would allow the universities to continue-with the most possible
discretion-to supplement classroom activities with a public fo-
rum that they have found beneficial to students' educational ex-
periences.
255. See 957 F.2d 991, 1002 (2d Cir. 1992).
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